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Chapter 1 Lecture 11 Pricing with Market Power Topics to be Discussed Capturing Consumer Surplus Price Discrimination Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Peak-Load Pricing Topics to be Discussed The Two-Part Tariff Bundling Advertising Introduction Pricing without market power (perfect competition) is determined by market supply and demand. The individual producer must be able to forecast the market and then concentrate on managing production (cost) to maximize profits. Introduction Pricing with market power (imperfect competition) requires the individual producer to know much more about the characteristics of demand as well as manage production. Capturing Consumer Surplus Capturing Consumer Surplus Capturing Consumer Surplus Capturing Consumer Surplus Price discrimination is the charging of different prices to different consumers for similar goods. Price Discrimination A firm with market power does not always have to sell all its output at the same price. Usually, it can do better if it doesn’t charge everyone the same price. The core of the price discrimination is transfer surplus from consumers to producers. If the firm charges one price for all customers, that price will be…………
Chapter 1 Lecture 15 Markets with Asymmetric Information Topics to be Discussed Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons Market Signaling Moral Hazard The Principal-Agent Problem Topics to be Discussed Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage Theory Introduction We will study how imperfect information influences resource allocation and the price system. Example: “Lemons” Problem In June, 1999, I was a visiting scholar in University of Sydney. I bought a heater at the price of $40. When I leave the Sydney, I want to sell the heater to the second-hand store. Can you guess how much the store want to pay me for the heater? (note: The heater is good in quality) Example: “Lemons” Problem The store only wanted to pay me only $2 for the heater. Why? Explanations for the lemon A lemons problem arises due to asymmetric information about product quality. For example, in the used heater market buyers determine the prices they are willing to pay according to their belief regarding the average quality of the heaters offered for sale. Sellers, in contrast, know the quality of their heaters and base the asking prices on the quality o…………
Chapter 1 Lecture 12 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Topics to be Discussed Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Price Competition Competition Versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma Topics to be Discussed Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing Cartels Monopolistic Competition Characteristics 1) Many firms 2) Free entry and exit 3) Differentiated product Monopolistic Competition The amount of monopoly power depends on the degree of differentiation. Examples of this very common market structure include: Toothpaste Soap Cold remedies Monopolistic Competition Toothpaste Crest and monopoly power Procter & Gamble is the sole producer of Crest Consumers can have a preference for Crest---taste, reputation, decay preventing efficacy The greater the preference (differentiation) the higher the price. Monopolistic Competition Question Does Procter & Gamble have much monopoly power in the market for Crest? Monopolistic Competition The Makings of Monopolistic Competition Two important characteristics Differentiated but highly substitutable products Free entry and exit A Monopolistically CompetitiveFirm in the Short and Long Run A Monopolistically CompetitiveFir…………
Chapter 1 Lecture 16 Externalities and Public Goods Topics to be Discussed Externalities Ways of Correcting Market Failure Externalities and Property Rights Common Property Resources Topics to be Discussed Public Goods Private Preferences for Public Goods Externalities Negative Action by one party imposes a cost on another party Positive Action by one party benefits another party External Cost Scenario Steel plant dumping waste in a river The entire steel market effluent can be reduced by lowering output (fixed proportions production function) External Cost Scenario Marginal External Cost (MEC) is the cost imposed on fishermen downstream for each level of production. Marginal Social Cost (MSC) is MC plus MEC. External Costs External Cost Negative Externalities encourage inefficient firms to remain in the industry and create excessive production in the long run. Externalities Positive Externalities and Inefficiency Externalities can also result in too little production, as can be shown in an example of home repair and landscaping. External Benefits Ways of Correcting Market Failure Assumption: The market failure is pollution Fixed-proportion production technology Must reduce output…………
Chapter 1 Lecture 13 Game Theory and Competitive Strategy Topics to be Discussed Gaming and Strategic Decisions Dominant Strategies The Nash Equilibrium Repeated Games Topics to be Discussed Sequential Games Threats, Commitments, and Credibility Entry Deterrence Bargaining Strategy Auctions Gaming and Strategic Decisions “ If I believe that my competitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits, how should I take their behavior into account when making my own profit-maximizing decisions?” Gaming and Strategic Decisions Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games Cooperative Game Players negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies Example: Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture by two firms (i.e. Microsoft and Apple) Binding contracts are possible Gaming and Strategic Decisions Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games Noncooperative Game Negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possible Example: Two competing firms assuming the others behavior determine, independently, pricing and advertising strategy to gain market share Binding contracts are not possible Gaming and Strategic Decisions Noncooper…………
Chapter 1 Lecture 14 General Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency Topics to be Discussed General Equilibrium Analysis Efficiency in Exchange Equity and Efficiency Efficiency in Production Topics to be Discussed The Gains from Free Trade On Overview--The Efficiency of Competitive Markets Why Markets Fail General Equilibrium Analysis Partial equilibrium analysis presumes that activity in one market is independent of other markets. General Equilibrium Analysis General equilibrium analysis determines the prices and quantity in all markets simultaneously and takes the feedback effect into account. General Equilibrium Analysis A feedback effect is a price or quantity adjustment in one market caused by price and quantity adjustments in related markets. General Equilibrium Analysis Two Interdependent Markets--Moving to General Equilibrium Scenario The competitive markets of: Videocassette rentals Movie theater tickets Two Interdependent Markets: Movie Tickets and Videocassette Rentals Two Interdependent Markets: Movie Tickets and Videocassette Rentals Two Interdependent Markets: Movie Tickets and Videocassette Rentals Observation Without considering the feedback effect with general equil

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